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Abstract. In games for which there exists a potential, the deviation-from-rationality dynamical model
for which each agent’s strategy adjustment follows the gradient of the potential along with a normally
distributed random perturbation, is shown to equilibrate to a Gibbs measure. The standard Cournot model
of an oligopoly is shown not to have a phase transition, as it is equivalent to a continuum version of the
Curie-Weiss model. However, when there is increased local competition among agents, a phase transition will
likely occur. If the oligopolistic competition has power-law falloff and there is increased local competition
among agents, then the model has a rich phase diagram with an antiferromagnetic checkerboard state, striped
states and maze-like states with varying widths, and finally a paramagnetic state. Such phases have economic
implications as to how agents compete given various restrictions on how goods are distributed. The standard
Cournot model corresponds to a uniform distribution of goods, whereas the power-law variations correspond
to goods for which the distribution is more localized.
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1. Introduction
Certain models in game theory [1, 2, 5, 6, 19, 20, 28, 29, 40, 41] analyze the dynamics of decisions made
by agents who adjust their decisions in the direction of higher payoffs, subject to random error and/or
information (deductive “deviations-from-rationality” models, cf. [7]). These errors, which are essentially
failures to choose the most optimal payoff, are understood to be intrinsic to the agents, and can be due
to stochastic elements such as preference shocks, experimentation, or actual mistakes in judgment. In all
of these contexts, the error is assumed to be due to intrinsic properties of the agents; i.e., the error is due
to the agents making decisions that deviate from the true, optimal decision. These stochastic approaches
commonly use a Langevin equation to deduce logit equilibrium measures for each individual agent.
The logit measures had been earlier discovered by different reasoning [23, 31]. Logit measures are
exploited in [1, 2], where agents use a continuum of pure strategies with decisions perturbed by white noise,
and additionally, agents can use a restricted form of mixed strategies which are absolutely continuous with
respect to the Lebesgue measure. A purely dynamical approach is taken in [28, 29], where a continuum
of pure strategies is assumed and the agents are restricted to using only these pure strategies with their
decisions perturbed by white noise. If agents are restricted to play a single pure strategy at any given
point in time as in [28, 29], mixed strategies in [1, 2] can be viewed as a time-average of the agent’s pure
strategies. Since averages are effectively used in the stationarity equations of [1, 2], it is not surprising that
the solutions for the logit measures are mean-field theoretic in nature insofar as they must find fixed points
for these equations to solve them. A mean-field static equilibrium is also found for a discrete Ising-type
logit model in [8]. The dynamics of a random utility model are also analyzed in [8], and shown to have
the same stationary state as with the mean-field analysis. The static equilibrium is that for a Curie-Weiss
model. Such concepts will be examined below within the context of statistical mechanics. For the dynamics
presented in this paper, we will assume that agents are myopic in pure strategy space; that is they play
a single pure strategy at any point in time as in [28, 29], and can only make infinitesimal adjustments in
pure strategy space over infinitesimal time. The difference between the dynamical approach in this paper
versus those in [1, 2, 7, 19, 20, 28, 29] is that a global approach is used 1, in full exploitation of potential
games [35]. As a result, a single stationary measure results, instead of multiple coupled measures in [1, 2].
An explicit form of the measure is also obtained in contrast to the aforementioned references.
It is noted that to allow agents to make effectively large moves in pure strategy over infinitesimal time
(effectively what happens in [1, 2]) is akin to allowing mixed strategies, and as a result, Nash equilibria
can be found much more quickly. As an example, consider pure-strategy quantities q1, q2, and q3 which
are positive real numbers. The dynamics of this paper does not allow a quick jump from q1 to q2 since
|q1 − q2| > 0, where | · | is the distance function on the line. However, with mixed strategies, an agent can
shift from q1 to (1− ǫ)q1 + ǫq2 for small epsilon, and get a quick sense of the strategy q2 from q1 and shift
towards q2 in one step if it is better. This can happen since ‖q1 − [(1− ǫ)q1 + ǫq2]‖ < 2ǫ, where ‖ · ‖ is the
distance function on the Banach space of Radon measures. This is similar to classical, noiseless potential
game theory when the Nash equilibrium is quickly and efficiently found to be a pure state (i.e., the global
interior maximum of the potential function) since agents can make large unilateral changes in decision.
This does not happen in the myopic, noisy dynamics presented here at nonzero temperature, as is evident
from the resulting mixed strategy Gibbs/logit stationary state. The classical game-theory equilibrium (i.e.,
Nash equilibrium) is attained from the Gibbs measure at zero temperature. A thorough analysis of types
of equilibria that occur in potential games can be found in [40].
In addition, an alternative view is proposed in this paper, in the context of potential games. The
same Gibbs/logit equilibrium distribution that results from myopic, noisy dynamics can be derived using
1A single dynamical equation tracks all agents, instead of one equation for each agent.
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certain axioms. This avoids explicit reference to error in agents’ decisions and extends easily to games
with discrete pure strategy spaces. These axioms are in fact those for equilibrium thermodynamics and are
used to do large deviation theory. Therefore this alternative approach is empirical in nature: our model of
agent behavior using thermodynamic axioms is based on many observations rather than the intrinsics (i.e.
dynamics) of the game. It will be shown that this Gibbs approach to games with a continuum of strategies
is equivalent to the aforementioned global, noisy, myopic deviations-from-rationality potential game. As in
classical statistical mechanics, we will assume the observables (i.e., functions of strategies) to be C(Ω), the
continuous functions on pure strategy space. Hence the general mixed strategies will be the probability
states in the dual of C(Ω), R1(Ω) = {µ ∈ C(Ω)∗|µ ≥ 0, µ(1) = 1}. That is to say the mixed strategies will
be generalized to probability Radon measures on Ω, which can include density functions with Lebesgue
measure (such as the Gibbs measure), and delta functions for pure states (zero-temperature/pure-rational
limits of Gibbs measures).
Since we only use one dynamical equation, only one stationary logit measure is obtained and we will
call this measure the Gibbs measure of the system, exactly as in statistical mechanics. This will also
avoid confusion with the more general case presented in [1, 2] of multiple logits for each agent. The
Gibbs measure here is one for the entire system of agents in the given game which results from the global
dynamical equation. This is a very interesting feature of potential games with noisy, myopic dynamics.
It is stated in [29] that “...in game theory, there is not a unique Hamiltonian, but rather each agent has
her own Hamiltonian to minimize.” This is true in general, but we’ll show that we do have a unique
Hamiltonian in the case of potential games. The idea of looking for something global to unify dynamics
was touched upon in [9] with the use of a “global cost function” in the ‘minority game’, but the technique
is through the use of another dynamical method called “inductive reasoning” [4], rather than errors to
deductive reasoning. Within inductive reasoning, an explicit formula for the stationary measure in terms
of the state of the agents does not appear. The equilibrium measures obtained here do have such an
explicit formula: a Gibbs measure in terms of the potential. The potential was pointed out in [1] to be
the common part of the payoff functions that includes the benefits or costs that are determined by each
agent’s own decisions (e.g., the effort costs). Mathematically, the potential is just like the negative energy
of all of the particles (i.e. agents) in a physical system (i.e. game) for a given state (i.e. point describing
each agent’s decision).
The essence of the thermodynamic approach is that we are measuring many cases of the same game,
as one would repeat an experiment many times to get average results; i.e., an ensemble average. The
errors are not explicitly encoded at the (microscopic) level of individual agent decisions in this approach.
However, this endogenous noise is implicitly assumed on a macroscopic level by requiring the ensemble
average of the potential be constant. 2 The average values are due to making many measurements and
averaging the results over the ensemble of the multitude of games being observed. Hence it’s assumed
that we don’t know the details of probabilities of being in various states, but rather that we must deduce
these probabilities from axioms of empirical observation. The size of the ensemble (i.e., the number of
representative games we observe) must be very large so that statistical laws of large numbers hold, and
that the empirical probabilities reflect the true intrinsic probability distribution of a single game. However,
unlike the ideas proposed in [24, 28, 29], we do not need to assume that there are a large number of agents
and we do not treat a single agent as though she is a system in a ‘heat bath’ of agents, which implies
an ensemble of agents and that we are only looking at one game. Rather, we treat the entire game as a
system, and look at an ensemble of many identical games. This approach also allows an easy generalization
to discrete/finite decisions. The partition function is introduced systematically and axiomatically, rather
than as a post-hoc mechanism to solve a minimum free energy problem in inductive models as in [13, 27].
The logit measure follows very naturally from the framework presented here. The limitation is that, for
2If one game in the ensemble gains potential, another must lose potential which is counter to purely rational behavior.
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now, a systematic introduction of a partition function (i.e., explicit stationary measure) is only justified
for potential games, whereas [1, 2, 27] is more general since agents have individual measures.
An interesting aspect of this Gibbs approach is that the coefficient that determines the importance of
errors in a stochastic potential game (the µi = 2/σ
2 in [1, 2] or the 2/ν2 in equation (6)) is directly
proportional to the usual notion of temperature in statistical mechanics. This was also discussed in [24] for
individual agents. In fact, in the kinetic theory of gases in equilibrium, the temperature T is proportional
to the average of the square of velocities v of the gas particles (T = k · 〈v2〉 for a constant k). If a game has
a potential that is the mathematical equivalent of such a gas, this equilibrium ‘kinetic’ theory states that
the ‘temperature’ of that game is proportional to the average of the square of the temporal rates-of-change
of decisions (T = c · 〈[dx/dt]2〉, where x ∈ [x, x¯] represents an agent’s decision). Hence larger instantaneous
changes in decisions by agents correspond to higher temperatures of the game, and in general, temperature
is a measure of the rate-of-change in decisions. In the dynamical sense [1, 2], temperature measures agents’
deviation from rationality.
A major application of statistical mechanics is to take infinite-agent limits from finite agent games, and
an example of this will be done to show the classical result of oligopolies approaching perfect competition
as the number of agents goes to infinity. This requires some modest technical restrictions to be made on the
potential function so that the finite-agent Gibbs measures will converge in the infinite-agent limit (c.f. [42]);
however these restrictions also make clear economic sense. A major advantage with the Gibbs approach for
potential games is that, for various potentials, all of the rigorous techniques for phase transitions can be
implemented as well as the process of renormalization of infinite-agent games. Renormalization would allow
us to look at behavior of aggregate blocks of agents at various scales. Dynamical renormalization is also
very recently being done in economics [17, 18], where large numbers of small firms are “agglomerated” and
the dynamics of the resulting “meta-firms” are examined via a sandpile model. It will only be mentioned
in this paper that renormalization can be done. The standard real-space renormalization is applicable to
any potential game with the imposition of a lattice dimension, since all agents interact in many classic
economic models. It would also be interesting to compare dynamical renormalization of the noisy myopic
dynamics with the real-space renormalization of the Gibbs measure. Hopefully, the model shown here
may be fruitful in understanding how local and global interactions between agents unify; that is to say a
better understanding and more systematic treatment of economic interactions at small and large scales.
Renormalization may link different economic scales as it does different scales in physics.
2. Potential Games and Axioms
Let us consider a game with a finite number of n agents, and all of these agents belong to the set Λ.
At any moment in time, agent i ∈ Λ can select an action or strategy xi ∈ Ai and the xi are the decision
variables. A configuration ~x of the system is any possible state of the system: ~x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn), where
each xi ∈ Ai. The set of all possible configurations of the game is Ω ≡
∏
iAi. A typical example of Ai is
an interval of real numbers Ai = [x, x¯]. The development below is for continuum decisions, and discrete
decisions will be accommodated later.
In this article, we will only consider potential games [35]. Let
V (~x) = V (x1, x2, . . . , xn) : Ω→ (−∞,∞) (1)
be the potential function for the game. Recall that a potential game is one such that every agent’s payoff
function ui(~x) satisfies
∂ui
∂xi
=
∂V
∂xi
(2)
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for some function V (~x).
Certain conditions must be imposed upon V in order that probability distributions exist when the number
of agents is taken to infinity in a limit. These conditions are well known functional-analytic restrictions
to ensure that infinite-volume limits exist (c.f. [42]). Basic postulates for a game in equilibrium will be
introduced (c.f. [39]). These are just the usual thermodynamics, and the probability of finding the game
in a particular state can be derived from these postulates of empirical observation.
Axiom 1 (conservation of energy). The game is isolated and agents act in such a way that the ensemble
average of the potential is a constant.
The ‘isolated’ requirement excludes outside sources from changing the potential for a given set of choices.
Even though agents in a specific game in the ensemble try to maximize potential, the intrinsic noise will
introduce errors into agents’ decisions such that an increase in potential in one game will correspond to a
decrease in the potential in one or more other games in the ensemble. Since purely rational agents attempt
to maximize potential, this axiom precludes perfect rationality unless the ensemble average of the potential
is the maximum potential (this is the zero-temperature case).
Axiom 2 (equilibrium/stationarity). The isolated game is in equilibrium. This is to say that the probability
of finding the game in any one state (i.e., a single representative from the ensemble) is independent of time.
This is the usual commonsense notion of equilibrium. From Axiom 2, all macroscopic parameters (those
that describe the system as a whole) are then also time-independent. Macroscopic parameters will be
described in more detail later, but examples are the average output per agent, the average payoff, and the
temperature.
Axiom 3 (ergodicity). The isolated game in equilibrium is equally likely to be in any of its accessible
states.
An accessible state ~x is any configuration of decisions ~x ∈ Ω with V (~x) = V0, given a fixed observed
potential V0 for the game (i.e., we look at all games in the ensemble with potentials of V0). If a potential
game with potential V has payoff functions ui(~x) for each agent i ∈ Λ, then
∂
∂xi
ui(~x) =
∂
∂xi
V (~x). (3)
If the potential for n agents is restricted to a constant value V0 (i.e., we look at a constant-potential
surface in Ω), then the equilibrium dynamical system of [1] is ergodic. Fluctuations will cause a system
to move among its accessible states over time with equal frequency, and ergodicity means essentially that
the system, over time, will visit each point on the constant potential surface. As such, it is equivalent to
assume all points on the constant V0 surface have the same probability of being observed. An interesting
consequence of this that the condition ∂V/∂t = 0 does not necessarily imply an equilibrium (c.f. [1]). If the
system were at a local maximum of V (at say ~x0) that isn’t a global maximum, then Axiom 3 implies the
system can’t stay at the single point ~x0. Rather, over time, it will move on the whole surface V = V (~x0).
Since V (~x0) isn’t a global maximum, the system will reach another point with the same potential but with
nonzero gradient, and the dynamics can move the system towards a higher potential than V (~x0).
The approach to stochastic game theory in [1] produces a single Fokker-Planck equation that the joint
probability distribution of decisions on Ω satisfies. There, the Langevin equations for the joint distribution
are
dxi(t) =
∂
∂xi
ui(~x, t)dt+ ν dwi(t), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (4)
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where the wi are zero-mean, unit-variance normal random variables and ν is a variance parameter.
The following result very similar to [1]. The major difference here is that we are looking at a dynamics for
all agents who only use pure strategies, whereas in [1] single-agent dynamics are analyzed separately, and
they use mixed strategies. The point of the following result is to show the stochastic dynamical approach
in global form leads to the same Gibbs measure as that derived from Axiom 1, Axiom 2, and Axiom 3.
The proof is in Appendix A. Again, it is important to note that the dynamics below assume agents only
use pure strategies and can only make small-distance moves over pure strategy space within a small time
period (myopic agents).
Proposition 4. Let f(~x) be the joint density over decision space Ω for a potential game with a finite
number of agents n and potential V . Consider the dynamics
d~x = ~∇V dt+ νd~w(t), (5)
where x ∈ Ω, d~x = (dx1, . . . , dxn), ~∇V = (∂V/∂x1, . . . , ∂V/∂xn), and ~w(t) = (w1(t), . . . , wn(t)) with the
wi(t) standard Wiener (or white noise) processes which are identical and independent across agents and
time. Furthermore, the wi(t) have mean zero and variance one and reflecting boundary conditions
3 are
used. Note that no conditional averages are done on V above, as opposed to [1, 2]. This indicates that only
pure strategies are being played.
If the process ~x(t) satisfies the dynamics of (4), then the joint density satisfies the Fokker-Planck equation
∂f(x, t)
∂t
= −~∇ · [~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)] + ν
2
2
∇2f(~x, t) (6)
and the corresponding equilibrium measure for variance ν2 is the Gibbs state
f(~x, t) = f(~x) =
exp
(
2
ν2
V (~x)
)∫
Ω
exp
(
2
ν2
V (~y)
)
d~y
. (7)
In statistical mechanics, the term in the exponent of (7) is−E(~x)/(kT ), where k is Boltzmann’s constant,
T is temperature, and E(~x) is the energy of configuration ~x. Hence the analogy of a potential game to
statistical mechanics is that ν2 (deviation from rationality; influence of the noise in dynamics (4)) is
proportional to ‘temperature’ and the potential V is the negative ‘energy’ of the system.
Now the Gibbs measure above can be derived using only the axioms of thermodynamics Axiom 1,
Axiom 2, and Axiom 3. The proof is the standard proof of the ‘canonical distribution’ in any text on
thermodynamics, and is the one that finds a state (i.e. probability measure) that maximizes entropy
under the condition of a constant ensemble-average energy. The variational form of this maximization
problem is the Gibbs variational principle of finding a state that maximizes the Helmholtz free energy.
It is interesting to note that the problem of finding a state that maximizes the Liapunov function (for
dynamical equilibrium) in [1] is identical to finding a state that minimizes the Helmholtz free energy of a
given potential game. This is exactly what the Gibbs variational principle accomplishes. It is no surprise
that the Liapunov function in [1] is the negative Helmholtz free energy for corresponding potential game
with no explicit noise. This fact is stated here as a contrast to Proposition 4:
Proposition 5. Let f(~x) be the joint density over decision space Ω for a potential game with a finite
number of agents n and a potential V . Suppose the three thermodynamic axioms Axiom 1, Axiom 2,
3This requires zero time derivatives on the boundary, specifically that (51) be satisfied for boundary points ~x.
6
and Axiom 3 hold. Then the equilibrium measure for this potential game is the Gibbs state at inverse-
temperature β ≡ (kT )−1:
f(~x, t) = f(~x) =
exp (βV (~x))∫
Ω
exp (βV (~y)) d~y
. (8)
Here the constant β in f(~x) is determined so that the mean potential
∫
Ω
V (~x)f(~x)d~x = V¯ , where V¯
is the ensemble-average observed potential (i.e., the sum of the potentials of each game in the ensemble
divided by the number of games g in the ensemble (V1 + · · ·+ Vg)/g). This is equivalent to the notion of
considering one game to reside within the ‘heat-bath’ of the other games in the ensemble with a fixed total
ensemble potential V1 + · · ·+ Vg.
We consider equilibrium states of an infinite-agent game to be the measure(s) resulting from the appro-
priate infinite-agent/volume limit of the Gibbs state.
In the case of potentials that fit the usual notion of an ‘interaction’ 4 in statistical mechanics (c.f. [42] for
the appropriate machinery), the infinite-agent measures will be consistent with the finite-agent measures
via the Dobrushin-Lanford-Ruelle equations. Such techniques can be used directly to analyze possible
phase transitions for an infinite-agent potential games. We can then consider equilibrium states of an
infinite-agent game to be the appropriate infinite-volume limit of the Gibbs measure.
3. Example: Cournot Oligopoly, Local Demand, Perfect Competition and Collusion
The simplest oligopoly model is due to Augustin Cournot (1838). There is one homogeneous good with
demand function p(Q), where Q is the total quantity of the good produced. Given an oligopoly of n firms,
if each firm produces an amount qi of the good, then
Q =
n∑
1
qi. (9)
For the sake of later analysis, each firm’s production qi will be scaled between a minimum production q ≥ 0
and a maximum production q¯ > q. We will assume each firm produces a sufficiently large number of the
good so that the qi can be regarded as continuum variables q ≤ qi ≤ q¯, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. For example, qi = 1
can represent the production of a sufficiently large number of goods. It is noted that smaller production
would be handled in the discrete case as in Section 4.
Each firm uses quantity qi as its strategy based on the payoff function
Πi = qip(Q)− Ci(qi), (10)
where Ci is the ith firm’s cost function. We will assume a linear (inverse) demand function
p(Q) = a− b
n
Q, (11)
with constants a > 0 and b > 0. Notice that b is divided by n so that demand is based on the average
production. Thus demand stays nonnegative for large n. For example, if each firm were to produce q¯,
p(nq¯) = a− bq¯ is well-behaved and non-trivial (i.e., doesn’t go to negative infinity or zero).
4It is noted that the potential for a Cournot oligopoly is not such an ‘interaction’, and other techniques must be used.
This is because of the 1/n factor; see Section 3 for the explicit potential.
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Constant marginal costs (i.e., C ′i = c, for a constant c > 0) will also be assumed, so that Ci(qi) = cqi+di,
and the payoff functions are now
Πi = qi
−b
n
n∑
1
qj + (a− c)qi − di. (12)
In the case of collusion, firms would try to maximize total industry profits
Π =
n∑
1
Πi = − b
n
n∑
i,j=1
qiqj + (a− c)
n∑
1
qi −
n∑
1
di. (13)
Both of these cases constitute potential games. A potential for the oligopoly in equation (12) is
Vo = − b
2n
∑
i,j
qiqj − b
2n
∑
q2i + (a− c)
∑
qi (14)
and a potential for collusion is the same as the collusion payoff function (except for the irrelevant constants
di) in equation (13),
Vc = − b
n
∑
i,j
qiqj + (a− c)
∑
qi (15)
These two potentials are two cases of the potential
V = − b
n
∑
i,j
qiqj − b˜
n
∑
q2i + (a− c)
∑
qi. (16)
To get the potential in equation (14), replace b and b˜ in equation (1) with b/2. To get the collusion
potential in equation (15), set b˜ to zero. 5
The Nash equilibrium for the Cournot oligopoly with potential V above is
q∗j =
a− c
2(b+ b˜/n)
. (17)
For non-collusion, q∗j = [n/(n+1)][(a− c)/b], and for collusion q∗j = (a− c)/(2b) are the Nash equilibria. 6
Note for collusion, the output is half of that for the non-collusive model, and hence firm profit (12) is less
than it would be for the non-collusive equilibrium. These classical equilibrium solutions will be recovered
in the perfectly rational case (zero temperature, β = 0) below, using the Gibbs approach.
The partition function for n agents is
Zn =
∫ n∏
i=1
dqi exp
[
−β b
n
∑
qiqj − β b˜
n
∑
q2i + β(a− c)
∑
qi
]
. (18)
5It is interesting to note the effect of collusion pertaining to rationality. If a− c = 0 in (16), then collusion has the effect
of doubling β in the partition function (18). The collusive model is simply the non-collusive oligopolistic model at half the
temperature 1/(2β) = T/2. In the infinite-agent limit, the oligopolistic model is the same as perfect competition. Hence
collusion is more “rational” behavior than perfect competition!
6These equilibria look like those for total industry output Q =
∑
qi in the standard literature, but as described below
(11), the scaling is at the level of firm production instead of industry production (where firm production would go to zero as
n increases).
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The infinite-agent free energy
F (β, a, b, b˜, c, q¯, q) = lim
n→∞
1
βn
ln(Zn,h). (19)
is calculated in Appendix B to be
F (β, a, b, c, q, q¯) =
b(q¯ + q)[b(q¯ + q)− 2(a− c)]
4β
− ln(q¯ − q)
β
− 1
β
min
y∈(−∞,∞)
−βby2 + ln
(
sinhc
[
βb(q¯ − q)y + β (q¯ − q)
2
{b(q¯ + q)− (a− c)}
]) (20)
where sinhc(x) = sinh(x)/x, sinhc(0) = 1, and it is noted that the free energy F is independent of b˜, which
can be set to zero. It is also shown in Appendix B that the expected value of any agent’s output is
〈qi〉 = ∂
∂a
F =
a− c
2b
+
ym(β, a, b, c, q, q¯)
βQb
, (21)
where |ym| < |(q¯ + q)/2 − (a − c)/(2b)|, ym < 0 when (a − c)/(2b) > (q¯ + q)/2, and ym > 0 when
(a − c)/(2b) < (q¯ + q)/2. Hence the Gibbs equilibrium is always between the average (q¯ + q)/2 and the
Nash Equilibrium (a− c)/(2b). In the completely irrational limit
lim
β→0
〈qi〉 =
q¯ + q
2
, (22)
and the output is pushed to the average as would be expected for uniformly random behavior. In the
completely rational limit,
lim
β→∞
〈qi〉 =


q if
a− c
2b
< q,
a− c
2b
q ≤ a− c
2b
≤ q¯,
q¯
a− c
2b
> q¯,
(23)
which is the classical Nash equilibrium for an infinite number of agents in (17).
From the properties of ym, we see that agents adjust output down (up) from q
∗ ≡ (a − c)/(2b) to-
wards the average output qav ≡ (q¯ + q)/2 if q∗ itself is larger (smaller) than qav. The magnitude of the
adjustment increases as the deviation from rationality (i.e., temperature or 1/β) increases. This shows
that a collusive-type behavior occurs insofar as agents produce less than the purely rational equilibrium
output q∗ when q∗ > qav. When q
∗ < qav, agents will produce more output than q
∗, which is anti-
collusive/supercompetitive.
It is also shown in Appendix B that the volatility, which is χ ≡ β−1∂2F/∂h2, is zero at zero temperature
(as expected for perfect rationality) and goes to (q¯− q)2/12 as temperature goes to infinity (i.e., randomly
acting agents have independent, uniformly distributed outputs qi). An agent’s payoff can be computed
using 〈q〉 and χ. Since 〈Πk〉 = limn→∞ qk[−b/n
∑n
j=1 qj + (a− c)] and 〈Πk〉 = 〈Πi〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have
〈Πk〉 = lim
n→∞
− b
n
χ + 〈qk〉(h− b〈qk〉) = 〈qk〉(h− b〈qk〉). (24)
The maximum payoff occurs at the Nash equilibrium 〈qk〉 = q∗. Furthermore, from the explicit formula for
〈qk〉 it is evident that 〈Πk〉 is an increasing function of β. Payoff increases as the deviation from rationality
(i.e. temperature) decreases.
The model presented above is the standard Cournot model, which assumes the inverse demand is sym-
metric among the agents. In reality, this is not typically the case. For example, water prices in parts of
9
a city with higher elevation may have a higher price because of additional costs of pumping the water.
Likewise, competition among agents may not be perfectly uniform. An example of this would be firms who
are more competitive against neighboring firms than with those far away, such as a local restaurant. It
draws customers from mostly one area, and would be in greater competition with other nearby restaurants.
The success or failure of distant restaurants would not have any affect. A single member of a restaurant
franchise competes with local restaurants, but colludes with other more distant members of the parent
company. In contrast to this would be a type of regional collusion, where all of the firms in any given
locale may work in collusion with each other in an attempt to outcompete distant firms.
To formalize these ideas, notice that an individual payoff function can be written as the collusion potential
minus all other agents’ payoff functions:
Πk = Vc −
∑
i 6=k
Πi. (25)
This shows an agent in oligopolistic competition will offset the collusive potential by subtracting the gains
made by all other agents. A smaller degree of competition would correspond to subtracting fewer of the
other agents payoffs.
Example 1 (Local Collusion Within a Global Oligopoly). Suppose n agents are assumed to lie at integer
points on the real line. If agents work collusively in disjoint groups of three, the payoffs are of the form
Πlck±1 = Π
lc
k =
∑
i=k,k±1
Πi =
∑
i=k,k±1
n∑
j=1
[
− b
n
qiqj + (a− c)qi
]
k = 3m, for integer m. (26)
A potential is Vlc = Vo − (b/n)
∑
k=3m,i=k±1 qiqk, where Vo is the oligopolistic potential in (14). Although
the potential is not translation invariant, if ‘block outputs’ Qk ≡ (qk−1 + qk + qk+1)/3, k = 3m, are used
along with periodic boundary conditions (qn ≡ q1) then a renormalized potential would be translation
invariant.
Example 2 (Local OligopolyWithin Global Collusion). Suppose now that agents collude with non-neighboring
agents and compete oligopolistically with neighboring agents within the same setting as Example 1. Here,
however, the agents are competing oligopolistically with nearest neighbors, and not in disjoint groups of
three. The payoffs are
Πlok =
∑
i 6=k±1
Πi = Vc − Πk−1 − Πk+1, (27)
where we define Π0 ≡ 0 and Πn+1 ≡ 0 to get correct payoffs. The potential is
Vlo = Vc +
b
n
n−1∑
i=1
qiqi+1 (28)
= − b
n
∑
qiqj + (a− c)
∑
qi +
b
n
n−1∑
i=1
qiqi+1. (29)
It is shown in Appendix B that the b˜ term in the potential V of (16) has no significance in the infinite-agent
limit because the number of terms in the summand is of order n, and as such it can be set to zero. This
is the case for the last nearest-neighbor sum in (26), and in the infinite-agent limit, the free energy is the
same as the collusion model. To maintain local oligopolistic competition in the infinite-agent limit, the
interaction term b/n must be changed to a constant δ > 0 that does not vanish as n→∞.
Example 3 (True Local Oligopoly Within Global Collusion). As mentioned in Example 2, an appropriate
potential that maintains local competition in the infinite-agent limit is
Vlo = − b
n
∑
qiqj + (a− c)
∑
qi + δ
n−1∑
i=1
qiqi+1, (30)
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where δ > 0.
The δ term in (30) only involves local interactions, that is, only terms within a fixed distance (of one)
appear in the summand. Such terms in the potential are also called local interactions.
Example 4 (Oligopoly With Stronger Local Competition). It is noted that in the infinite-agent limit,
replacing b with b/2 in (30) is equivalent to changing the collusive potential component Vc to the standard
oligopoly potential Vo. We can then interpret the (infinite-agent) free energy generated by the potential
Vlo to be oligopolistic competition with increased local competition.
The potential in (30) is also generated by payoff functions
Πˆlok = qk
(
−2b
n
∑
j
qj + (a− c) + δ
[
qk−1 +
b
δn
qk + qk+1
]
,
)
(31)
where q0 ≡ qn+1 ≡ 0 applies. The dynamics generated by the Πˆlok in (31) and the Πlok in (27) are identical,
since they generate the same potential. Likewise, the infinite-agent free energies are the same, and as
argued previously, the term bqk/(δn) will have no effect in the infinite-agent limit.
What is interesting about (31) is that an inverse demand function appears:
pk(q1, . . . , qn) = p(Q) + δ
[
qk−1 +
b
δn
qk + qk+1
]
, (32)
where p(Q) is a standard linear inverse demand as in (11). The remaining term only involves terms local
to agent k, and is called a local (inverse) demand function. Also notice that payoffs cannot be described
by a single global demand p(Q), and each agent has her own demand function pk.
The reason for the consideration of the addition of local demand as with (30) is that a phase transition is
possible in contrast to the lack of one for the standard Cournot oligopoly. This will be shown in Section 4
for a discrete model which is a version of the Cournot model with local demand.
Finally, we consider a situation where local demand for an agent’s good is less affected by more distant
firms.
Example 5 (Power-Law Falloff of Local Demand). Imagine agents residing at integer coordinates in a box
in d-dimensional space; call this set Q ⊂ Zd. Consider the local inverse demand functions
pk(q1, . . . , qn) = −2b
∑
j∈Q:j 6=k
qj
|k − j|w + (a− c) + 2δ
∑
i:|i−k|=1
qi, (33)
where |i − j| is the distance between agents i and j, and w ≥ 1. Here, the δ-term again represents
heightened local competition, but the b-term is in a different form. The output of agents more distant
from agent k has less of an effect on the inverse demand of agent k. This can be due to a variety of issues.
Local agents may have more of a local market share because more distant agents could have to pay more
for shipping, which can increase the price of their good in more distant regions. A variation of that is the
good is primarily bought and not shipped, with customers preferring to travel less distance to purchase the
good. This is in contrast to the previous term p(Q) in (11) which assumes goods are circulated uniformly
in a global market, with no barriers that would put more emphasis on local output.
A potential for payoffs Πk = qkpk is
Vw = −b
∑
(i,j)
qiqj
|i− j|w + (a− c)
∑
qi + δ
∑
〈i,j〉
qiqj , (34)
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where (i, j) indicates a sum over distinct pairs of sites in Q and 〈i, j〉 indicates a sum over nearest neighbors
|i− j| = 1.
It has been shown that a very interesting phase transition occurs for a discrete version of (34) above,
which will be outlined in Section 4. This phase transition is very distinct from the phase transition
speculated for the discrete version with the standard p(Q) term. We then see that an interesting feature
of the Gibbs model of Cournot competition is that it distinguishes between models with uniform and
nonuniform distribution of goods for certain ranges of parameters β, b, and δ.
4. Example: Gibbsian Minority Game
The inductive minority game (see, for example, [14, 25]) is a version of the El Farol bar problem
[4, 27] that was introduced to analyze cooperative behavior in markets. It is introduced in the context of
inductive reasoning and non-equilibrium statistical mechanics, but we will look at it in another way since
the utility functions can be derived from a potential. An interesting point is that the dynamical equations
in the inductive reasoning view do not satisfy detailed balance and there is a dynamical phase transition
separating an ergodic from a non-ergodic process (c.f. the discussion in [16]). Similarly, there are Glauber
dynamics for the Ising model which use sequential site updating and do not in general satisfy detailed
balance, but nevertheless do converge to the appropriate Gibbs measure by stationarity (see [43] for an
example). The lack of detailed balance usually suggest a study of dynamics, but the advantage of a Gibbs
approach is that the dynamics yield an explicit stationary equilibrium state.
In equilibrium analysis, many models exhibit a unique translation invariant infinite-volume state (hence
ergodicity) at high temperature, while at lower temperatures there are multiple states and non-ergodic
translation invariant limiting states exist (c.f. [42] for details). As such it seems reasonable to consider
a Gibbs model of the minority game. First, for the sake of background, we will introduce the inductive
reasoning form of the game as presented in [16], and then contrast it with the Gibbsian version.
The inductive game consists of n agents, labeled i = 1, . . . , n. For simplicity, we can picture these agents
lined up at integers on a one-dimensional axis, hence the agents are situated at sites Λ ⊂ Z. 7 At each
discrete time step t, each agent i must make a decision σi ∈ {−1, 1} (such as to ‘buy’ or ‘sell’). The
agents decide to buy or sell based on public information I(t) that is available to all agents at time t (c.f.
the discussion in [16]). Note that at a given time, all agents receive the identical piece of information.
Examples of such information could be the state of the market (decisions off all agents, the decisions of
agents on odd sites, the block/regional-averages of decisions on blocks of length n/100, etc.), the weather
forecasts, change in government regulations, etc.
Profit, or utility, is made at time step t by agents according to the formula
ui(t) =
−b
n
σi(t)
n∑
i=1
σj(t) (35)
with b > 0. Because the coefficient −b < 0, the profit ui(t) ≥ 0 when σi(t) = − sgn [
∑n
i=1 σj(t)]. The
justification is that in a market, if the majority is selling it is profitable to buy and vice-versa. Further
notice the payoff function is scaled by 1/n. It is mentioned in [16] to exist for mathematical convenience,
but we will see later that it is needed for stability of the thermodynamic limit. Economically it makes
sense to scale this way so that the inherent inverse demand function stays finite (see Section 3).
7Because of the form of the potential, this model is not a d-dimensional lattice model for any d. We have chosen to use
d = 1 for visualization, and later, a true d-dimensional term will be added to the potential.
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Now the element of public information will be introduced. It is noted in [25] that a phase transition
occurs without the element of information, and all that is needed is stochastic mixed strategies. In
[16], information is randomly drawn at time t from a set {I1, . . . , Ip}. For example, at time t a number
µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , p} is drawn randomly and the information Iµ(t) is given to all agents, so that I(t) = Iµ(t)
with 1 ≤ µ(t) ≤ p.
The information I(t) is converted into a configuration of n trading decisions σ(t) = (σ1(t), . . . , σn(t)).
These are determined using ‘response strategies’, which are look-up tables or functionsRi,s = (R
1
i,s, . . . , R
p
i,s) ∈
{−1, 1}p. Each agent i has S decision making strategies Ri,s with s ∈ {1, . . . , S}. The strategy that each
agent i plays depends on the public information I(t). If I(t) = Iµ(t), agent i will choose a strategy s and
then lookup the decision R
µ(t)
i,s = ±1 in the vector Ri,s. Agent i will then make the decision σi(t) = Rµ(t)i,s ,
which depends on her choice of strategy and public information.
Finally, the last ingredient is for agents to evaluate strategies based on the market performance of the
strategies. At time t, strategy Ri,s is profitable if and only if R
µ(t)
i,s = − sgn [
∑n
i=1 σj(t)]. Each agent i will
then measure the cumulative performance of each strategy Ri,s, 1 ≤ s ≤ S by a profit-indicator pi,s which
is updated at each time step t by
pi,s(t + 1) = pi,s(t)− b
n
R
µ(t)
i,s
∑
j
σj(t). (36)
Note that at time t, all strategies are updated for each agent. Likewise note that the above is an evaluation
scheme of strategies, and the strategies R are coupled to the actual decision σi(t) (since σi(t) appears in the
sum). Additionally, these hypothetical decisions are being tracked in time, even though some aren’t actually
made. At time t, each agent i now chooses strategy si(t) which has the best cumulative performance pi,s(t)
up to that time.
Given the external information µ(t), the dynamics of the minority game are given by
pi,s(t+ 1) = pi,s(t)− b
n
R
µ(t)
i,s A(t),
A(t) =
∑
j
R
µ(t)
j,s ,
si(t) = argmaxs∈{1,...,S} pi,s(t).
(37)
Some interesting observations about the above approach need be made. Firstly, a phase transition
occurs in the above inductive model even though the model is a totally frustrated one. The fact that
something stochastic is what introduces the phase transition makes sense since this is what happens in the
setting of spin glasses and replica symmetry breaking (c.f. [16, 26, 9]). It has also been shown in [22, 37]
that the inductive reasoning model seems insensitive to the types of long range interactions that may
occur. Speculatively, it seems that the global nature of public information can outweigh the interactions
among agents, just as a global magnetic field can alter the susceptibility/volatility in a fully frustrated
model. However, there are some fundamental physical and economical differences between the long-range
interactions presented in [22, 37]. The economical differences were described in Section 3 as local versus
global inverse demand and/or availability of goods. The physical differences between such interactions are
significant, as will be shown below.
This motivates us to study the minority game in a different light than the inductive approach above. Now
we will introduce the Gibbs model of the minority based on statistical observation of deductive reasoning
and show how this model distinguishes local and global demand. The Gibbs approach is not inductive:
only the values of the agents’ decisions are considered. Which inductive strategy an agent may be using is
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irrelevant. In other words, we do not distinguish inductive strategies Ri,s that an agent may be considering,
but only look at her final decision σi to buy or sell.
In the simplest Gibbs model, there is no phase transition, but the infinite-volume volatility (c.f. Ap-
pendix B for the continuum version) does display nonrandom behavior at finite temperature. There are
phase transitions in the Gibbs model if local interactions among agents are added which represent greater
competition among local firms. This will be pursued below.
Notice that the utility functions in (35) can be deduced in the sense of (2) from the potential
V (σ) =
−b
n
∑
i,j
σiσj , (38)
where b > 0 and there are n agents. The agents can be pictured to lie on integer points of some lattice,
but dimensionality of the lattice is irrelevant since all agents interact. If short-range perturbations are
added, the dimensionality of the lattice is then relevant. In the basic model presented here, the volatility
is differentiable in the global field (i.e., no phase transition; see below). However, we will momentarily
digress from the basic model in (38) and look at variations in an attempt to determine what may cause a
phase transition.
Consider this new model (in (38) below) to lie in two dimensional space, and the addition of nearest
neighbor ferromagnetic/aligning interactions. These local aligning interactions correspond to the (local)
inverse demand for an agent
pi(σ) =
−b
n
∑
j
σj + δ
∑
j:|j−i|=1
σj , (39)
where b > 0 and δ > 0. When n is large, the local aligning interactions having coefficient δ correspond to
the ith agent’s inverse demand function increasing in response to local supply increase (i.e. selling, or the σj
changing from +1 to −1 for |j− i| = 1). On the surface, this seems contrary to usual supply and demand,
since inverse demand should be a decreasing function of supply variables σj .
8 Mathematically, these
interactions give more probability weight in the Gibbs measure to configurations with more alignments
between local agents. This could be interpreted as a reward when nearest agents to do the same thing
(i.e., align: all buy or all sell). It could be a purely psychological reward for “following the herd”, and
not part of the monetary economic demand function, since utility or payoff functions need not be based
on monetary payoff alone. It could also be a form of monetary influence where agents are willing to pay
other agents to go along with their ideas. Since an agent only has a relatively small amount of money, they
would only be able to payoff several agents. However, it is important to note that the first term of (39)
may penalize the agent for alignment. Ultimately, whether or not an agent benefits from aligning depends
on the phase of the system.
A potential for the model with payoffs in (39) is
V (σ) =
−b
n
∑
i,j
σiσj + δ
∑
〈i,j〉
σiσj, (40)
where b > 0, δ > 0, i, j ∈ Z2, and the last sum is over nearest neighbors |i− j| = 1. It has been speculated
that the model in (40) has a transition as T = 1/β → 0 from a fully frustrated state to a ferromagnetic,
or fully aligned, state provided b < 4δ [10]. If b > 4δ there would likely be no transition and only full
frustration as with (38) [10]. Completely aligned states should occur in some cases, and there should not
always be only fully frustrated states.
8One interpretation in Section 3 is that such aligning terms are due to heightened local competition. Aligning terms result
from agents subtracting the utility/payoff of nearest-neighbor agents from their own utility functions.
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In the case of overhyped introductory price offerings, essentially everyone is in a frenzy to buy and we
would see the configuration of σi = −1 for all i. If news got out that a company lost all of its worth,
everyone would sell and we would see the configuration of σi = +1 for all i. The aligning interactions are
the only way to support such states without the addition of a field term (a− c)∑σi, as the model in (38)
has no phase transition (cf. Appendix B). The addition of such a ‘field’ term, which has demand and cost
components, will support such states in the absence of a phase transition. The demand/cost component
should be able to support such states, since such extreme market reactions result in pricing adjustments
(changes in a). However, it was shown in Section 3 that the aligning terms can be interpreted as increased
local competition. Such effects can become large in such a frenzied environment, and large alignments
may occur no matter how small the demand/cost term a− c may be if the temperature is low enough (i.e.,
agents are not deviating much from “rational” behavior).
The model in (40) is similar to the models studied and summarized in [30, 11, 33]. The salient difference
is that [30, 11, 33] study a long-range ‘Coulomb’ (w = 1) or ‘dipole’ (w = 3) on the two-dimensional square
lattice
V (σ) = −b
∑
i,j
σiσj
|i− j|w + δ
∑
〈i,j〉
σiσj , (41)
where the i, j ∈ Z2 are two-component vectors with integer coordinates. These models are very rich, and
interesting in an economic sense: the local demand functions should depend more strongly on local agents,
and not depend significantly on distant agents. This suggests that output of goods local to an agent has
more of an affect on that agent than goods that are distant from the agent, i.e., that local inverse demand
(cf. Section 3) depends more on local supply. The model in (40) assumes that local inverse demand is
identical for each agent, and that distant goods are equally accessible to an agent as local goods. There is
a fundamental difference between these interactions. An important difference in two dimensions between
(40) above and models with falloff potentials where n is replaced with |i− j|w, w = 1, 3, is that the latter
models can have a phase transition to an antiferromagnetic phase at low temperatures and the former
model has no such phase transition and only totally frustrated ground states. Antiferromagnetic phases
correspond to a checkerboard of +1’s and −1’s in the plane, which is ordered behavior of agents. The
agents with potential (40) have no such ordered behavior: +1’s and −1’s are seen equally but in a random
unordered fashion, which reflects that supply is equally accessible to everyone.
There are four types of phases in the dipolar model (cf. [11] for details and references). The first two
occur below a critical temperature Tc(∆) that depends on ∆ = δ/b. When ∆ is smaller than ∆a ≈ 0.425,
the ground state is the antiferromagnetic one, consisting of a checkerboard of +1 and −1 values of the σ.
When ∆ > ∆a, the transition is from the antiferromagnetic state to a state consisting of antialigned stripes
of width one, representing large areas of buyers and large areas of sellers that persist in some direction.
As ∆ gets larger, the stripes grow in width. For example, stripes of widths two, three, and four appear at
∆k ≈ 1.26, 2.2, 2.8, respectively.
The other two phases occur when T ≥ Tc(∆). There is a transition to a disordered tetragonal phase
above and near the Tc(∆), and this phase is not paramagnetic. There are extended ferromagnetic domains
characterized by predominantly square corners, and a typical configuration looks like a maze of +1 trails
and −1 walls. For larger temperatures, the transition is to a paramagnetic phase. Similar phase behavior
occurs for the w = 1 Coloumb model in (41) [33].
The antiferromagnetic phase is one with buyers and sellers in a checkerboard pattern. This hap-
pens when the demand p(Q) is mostly due to nearest-neighbor oligopolistic competition; i.e., the terms
−b∑i:|i−k|=1 qkqi dominate agent k’s demand function. When there are stripes there are large areas per-
sisting in some direction that are buying and other such areas that are selling. In this case, agent k has
localized oligopolistic competition in one direction and heightened local competition in the other direction.
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As the stripes widen, there is heightened local competition within the stripes, and a localized oligopolistic
competition among the groups of agents in the stripes. In the tetragonal phase, there are large unordered
areas of buyers and sellers that look like a maze. In the paramagnetic phase, buyers and sellers tend
to appear at random, and this corresponds to the standard Cournot model of nonlocalized oligopolistic
competition.
It seems intuitive that (40) would not display stripes, but rather be fully frustrated or completely aligned;
that is, if supply is globally accessible and local prices are essentially the same for all agents (such as a
homogeneous market with no trade barriers and uniform distribution of goods) then there should not be
large clumps of buyers and sellers. On the other hand, if there are no local interactions as in (38), then
there should only be antiferromagnetic states or fully frustrated states with high probability, and no large
clumps of buyers or sellers.
The numerical evidence in [22, 37] for the inductive minority game (37) suggests it is insensitive to the
types of long range interactions; specifically that the types in (38) of equal interaction strength show the
same behavior as the falloff types in (41) with δ = 0. This is in contrast to the deductive model presented
here.
The stochastic nature of public information in the inductive model does induce a phase transition. It
would be interesting to determine if the deductive model presented here with a random field component,
which could be represented by random marginal cost fluctuations (cf. Section 3), will yield a phase
transition. Such random costs could, for example, represent the fees, which vary from agent to agent,
charged to each agent per buy/sell. In [38], the addition of demand into a model of stock trade is analyzed
by introducing an effective field as mentioned above.
Evidence is found in [37] that the dynamics of the inductive minority game is intrinsic to resource
allocation. The view of the minority game as a potential game makes clear why this is the case, in the
sense that all potential games are isomorphic to congestion problems [35], and the potential for the minority
game is a specific, discrete case of a supply-and-demand potential (c.f. Section 3).
5. Conclusion
We have seen that potential games (with nice potentials), when coupled with deviations-from-rationality,
result in models for which equilibrium values of all relevant (macroscopic) quantities such as output per
agent, payoff per agent, etc., are determined by averaging over a Gibbs measure with the given potential at
inverse temperature β. The introduction of temperature in economics simply corresponds to the assumption
that players deviate from the purely rational behavior of producing output in the direction of maximum
increasing payoff.
A very nice feature of the Gibbs approach is that it is accessible and demonstrates different patterns
of behavior among agents for different types of distribution of goods. This is desirable when modeling
trade barriers, shipping costs, and real-life models such as restaurants, where demand is localized. It can
also be used in conjunction with renormalization techniques, which could model large-scale behavior of
‘agglomerated’ agents, analogous to block spins for physical systems.
It would also be of interest to pursue more depth insofar as the economic implications of different types
of phases for the different models presented here. Since the author is not an economist, such an endeavor
will be left to the experts.
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Appendix A. Proof of Vector Fokker-Planck Equation
Here we will show the derivation of a vector Fokker-Planck equation for the joint distribution given the
Langevin dynamics in [1]. This proof is just a slight modification of the proof in [1]. We only consider a
finite number of agents n <∞.
In a potential game, the Itoˆ equation for dynamics is d~x = ~∇V dt+σd~w(t) as in (4). For a small change
in time ∆t, the dynamics can be written
∆~x(t) ≡ ~x(t+∆t)− ~x(t) = ~∇V∆t + σ∆~w(t) + ~o(∆t), (42)
with σ∆~w(t) a normal random variable of mean zero and variance σ2∆t, and ~o(∆t) is the usual vector
‘little order’ notation. 9 The configuration of decisions ~x(t) at time t is hence a random variable with
time-dependent joint density f(~x, t). Let h(~x) : Ω→ (−∞,∞) be an arbitrary twice differentiable function
such that h and ~∇h vanish on the boundary ∂Ω of decision space Ω. Note h does not explicitly depend on
time. Then the expected value of h(~x) (over phase space) at time t+∆t is
E [h(~x(t+∆t))] =
∫
Ω
h(~x)f(~x, t+∆t)d~x, (43)
where d~x is the product measure dx1dx2 · · · dxn on Ω. Note above that ~x(t+∆t) on the left side represents
the random variable over which the expected value E is to be taken 10, whereas the ~x’s on the right side
are the points in Ω. Equation (42) can be used to obtain another expression for (43) 11:
E [h(~x(t+∆t))] = E [h(~x(t) + ∆x(t))] = E
[
h(~x(t) + ~∇V (~x(t))∆t + σ∆~w(t))
]
+ ~o(∆t). (44)
The expression on the right hand side of (43) will be subtracted from the Taylor expansion of the right
side of (44) to yield the Fokker-Planck equation. We will proceed as follows.
Let g(~y) be the (joint) density of σ∆~w(t), which is an n-dimensional normal density with mean zero and
variance σ2∆t. The left side of (44) is in terms of the random variables ~x(t+∆t), and the right side is in
terms of the variables ~x(t) and ~y with respective densities f(~x, t) and g(~y). Accordingly, the right side of
(44) can be written as an integral over these densities:
E [h(~x(t +∆t))] =
∫
Rn
∫
Ω
h
(
~x(t) + ~∇V (~x(t))∆t+ σ~y
)
f(~x, t)g(~y)d~xd~y, (45)
where R = (−∞,∞).
The Taylor expansion of the right side of (45) yields∫
Rn
∫
Ω
{
h(~x(t)) + ~∇h(~x(t)) · [~∇V (~x(t))∆t + ~y]
+
1
2
[~∇V (~x(t))∆t+ ~y] ·D2h(~x(t)) · [~∇V (~x(t))∆t + ~y]T + ~o(∆t)
}
f(~x, t)g(~w)d~x d~y,
(46)
where D2h is the second-derivative matrix for h (i.e., the ij entry is ∂2h/∂xi∂xj) and the transpose of a
row vector ~v is the column vector ~v T .
9~v(∆t) is ~o(∆t) if lim∆t→0 vi(∆t)/(∆t) = 0 for each component vi of ~v.
10Rigorously, the map ~x(t) → ~x(t + ∆t) generates a differentiable global (stochastic) flow on decision space Ω for nice
potentials, and the global flow has a generator which will be shown below.
11For simplicity, we use the formal notation of differential stochastic calculus.
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Integrating (46) over the ~y eliminates terms linear in yi as well as the mixed second-order terms since
the yi have mean zero and are independent. The expected value of w
2
i is σ
2∆t, hence (46) reduces to∫
Ω
h(~x(t))f(~x, t)dx+∆t
∫
Ω
~∇h(~x(t)) · ~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)d~x
+∆t
σ2
2
∫
Ω
∇2h(~x(t))f(~x, t)d~x+ o(∆t),
(47)
where o(∆t) is the one-component version of ~o(∆t) and ∇2 is the Laplacian. Thus the generator for the
Langevin dynamics ~x(t + t0) = L
t~x(t0) is L = (~∇V ) · ~∇ + (σ2/2)∇2, where L acts on twice-differentiable
functions on Ω that vanish on the boundary. It is easy to show L is symmetric and the domain of its
adjoint is the Sobolev space H2(Ω) for a well-behaved potential V . We view its adjoint L* as a densely
defined unbounded operator in L2(Ω, d~x). The idea is apparent from the following.
Using Green’s identities, the integrals containing the terms ~∇h and ∇2h can be integrated by parts, and
the boundary integrals vanish on the boundary ∂Ω (since h and ~∇h do) leaving a new expression for (47):∫
Ω
h(~x(t))f(~x, t)dx−∆t
∫
Ω
h(~x(t))~∇ · [~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)]d~x
+∆t
σ2
2
∫
Ω
h(~x(t))∇2f(~x, t)d~x+ o(∆t).
(48)
This shows that the adjoint of L operates as L∗(f) = −~∇ · (f ~∇V ) + (σ2/2)∇2f . Equations (43) and (48)
are identical, hence subtracting them yields∫
Ω
h(~x(t))[f(~x, t+∆t)− f(~x, t)]dx = ∆t
∫
Ω
h(~x(t))[−~∇ · [~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)] + σ
2
2
∇2f(~x, t)]d~x+ o(∆t).
(49)
Dividing (49) by ∆t, taking the limit ∆t→ 0 results in the Fokker-Planck equation (6) since the set of all
such h’s described are a separating set for probability densities on Ω (i.e., these h’s can weakly approach
delta functions on Ω).
Let h(~x) be an observable (i.e. function) on Ω that is differentiable, vanishes on ∂Ω, and doesn’t depend
explicitly on time. For a stationary state f , the average of h(~x) is constant in time:
0 =
∂
∂t
∫
Ω
h(~x)f(~x, t)d~x
=
∫
Ω
h(~x)~∇ ·
{
−[~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)] + σ
2
2
~∇f(~x, t)
}
= −
∫
Ω
~∇h(~x) ·
{
−[~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)] + σ
2
2
~∇f(~x, t)
}
.
(50)
Since h was arbitrary and ~∇h can be made to approach delta functions, for a stationary state
−[~∇V (~x(t))f(~x, t)] + σ
2
2
~∇f(~x, t) = 0. (51)
We then see that the Gibbs state in (7) is the unique solution to (51), and is the equilibrium state for the
potential game. The negative of the Helmholtz free energy is in fact a Liapunov function for the dynamics
and it can be used to show (see [1]) that the unique finite-agent solution equation (7) of equation (51) is
attained in the long run.
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Appendix B. Solution of the Cournot Free Energy
The free energy for the Cournot oligopoly and collusion is obtained from the partition function in
equation (18)
Zn
(
b˜
)
=
∫
eβV =
∫ q¯
q
exp
[
−β b
n
n∑
j,k=1
q˜j q˜k − β b˜
n
n∑
j=1
q˜2j + β(a− c)
n∑
j=1
q˜j
]
n∏
j=1
dq˜j . (52)
The limit of the free energy
Fn
(
b˜
)
=
1
βn
ln
(
Zn
(
b˜
))
(53)
will be shown below. First note that the limit does not depend on the value of b˜, since
− b˜q¯
2
n
+ Fn ≤ Fn
(
b˜
)
≤ − b˜q
2
n
+ Fn, (54)
where Fn ≡ Fn(0). It then suffices to set b˜ to zero in equation (52), which will be done below to simplify
a limit. For further manipulation, changing variables to q = q˜ − γ, γ ≡ (q¯ + q)/2, h ≡ a− c, results in
Zn =exp

−βbγ2n− βb˜γ2 + βhγn+ βn
b
(
γb+ γ
b˜
n
− h
2
)2
×
∫
[−Q/2,Q/2]n
exp

−β
(√
b
n
∑
qj +
√
n
b
(
bγ +
b˜
n
γ − h
2
))2
− β b˜
n
∑
q2j

 n∏
j=1
dqj,
(55)
where Q ≡ q¯ − q.
The solution can be found using a saddle point method, and the key is to use the identity
e−βp
2
=
1√
π
√
4β
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
− 1
4β
t2 + ipt
)
dt (56)
as with the simplest case in [21]. Using the above in (55) and setting η ≡ bγ + b˜γ/n− h/2 results in
Zn = 1√
π
√
4β
exp
[
βh2n
4b
+ βb˜γ
(
b˜γ
bn
+ γ − h
b
)]∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[−1
4β
t2 + i
√
n
b
ηt
]
×
{∫ Q/2
−Q/2
exp
[
−β b˜
n
q2
]
exp
[
i
√
b
n
qt
]
dq
}n
dt,
(57)
where the order of integration was changed via Fubini’s theorem. Consider part of the integrand above
gn
(√
b
n
t
)
=
1
Q
∫ Q/2
−Q/2
exp
[
−β b˜
n
q2
]
exp
[
iq
√
b
n
t
]
dq = sinc
(
Q
2
√
b
n
t
)
, (58)
where sinc(x) ≡ sin(x)/x (sinc(0) ≡ 1), b˜ was explicitly set to zero, and a normalizing factor was added so
that gt(0) = 1. Changing variables to tˆ = t/
√
n, the partition function can then be written
Zn =exp [−βγ(bγ − h)n] Q
n
√
n√
π
√
4β
×
∫ ∞
−∞
{
exp
[
− 1
4β
(
tˆ− i 2β√
b
η
)2]
sinc
(
Q
2
√
b tˆ
)}n
dtˆ.
(59)
Now a basic fact is needed to determine the limit of the free energy.
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Lemma 6. Let f(x) be a bounded, continuous, real-valued, integrable function on the real line R and
let G be an open set. Suppose there is a point x0 ∈ G for which |f(x)| < f(x0) for all x 6= x0 and
lim sup |f(x)| < f(x0) for all x outside of some neighborhood of x0 contained in G. Then
lim
m→∞
{∫
G
[f(x)]m+k dx
}1/m
= f(x0) (60)
for any fixed integer k. Furthermore, for a function g(x) that is continuous at x0 with gf
k ∈ L∞,
lim
m→∞
∫∞
−∞
g(x) [f(x)]m dx∫∞
−∞
[f(x)]m dx
= g(x0). (61)
Proof. First, by factoring ‖f‖∞ out of the integral in (60), we may assume f(x0) = 1 by considering the
function f/‖f‖∞. Choose a number ǫ0 > 0 so that lim sup |f(x)| < 1−2ǫ0 for all x outside of a neighborhood
N ⊂ G of x0 and f > 0 on N . Let S1−ǫ0 = {x ∈ G|f(x) ≥ 1− ǫ0}, and Im = (
∫
G
[f(x)]m+k dx)1/m. Since
Im ≤ f(x0)(m+k−2)/m(
∫
G
f 2(x) dx)1/m for large m, lim supm→∞ Im ≤ f(x0). The inequality
(Im)
m ≥ (1− ǫ)m+k−2
∫
S1−ǫ
f 2(x) dx− (1− 2ǫ0)m+k−2
∫
G−N
f 2(x) dx (62)
holds for all ǫ ≤ ǫ0. Upon factoring out (1− ǫ)m+k−2, it is seen that lim infm→∞ Im ≥ f(x0). To prove (61),
the following is needed:
lim
m→∞
∣∣∣∣∣
∫
R−S1−ǫ
g(x) [f(x)]m dx∫
G
[f(x)]m dx
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ‖gfk‖∞ limm→∞
∫
R−S1−ǫ
|f(x)|m−k dx∣∣∫
G
[f(x)]m dx
∣∣ = 0, (63)
where the last equality follows from the root test for convergence since the hypothesis implies the limit of
the ratio on the right side of (63) to the power 1/m is less than one. With this, (61) reduces to∫
S1−ǫ
g(x)[f(x)]m dx∫
R
[f(x)]m dx
. (64)
By the continuity of g and (63) again with G = S1−ǫ, it is seen that (61) holds. 
To apply Lemma 6 to the partition function in (59), the integration path along the real line must
be deformed in the complex plane to a path on which the integrand is real-valued. As such, consider
the function f(z) = exp [−k(z + iη0)2] sinc(z), where η0 = −βQη and 1/k = βbQ2 (changing variables
t = Q
√
b tˆ/2 in (59); note η0 is increasing in h).
Let z = x+ iy, and f(z) = R(x, y)+ iI(x, y), where x, y,R, I are real-valued. Then we are interested in
the paths (x(s), y(s)) in the complex plane C on which I = 0. Since f is holomorphic and not identically
zero, the gradient of I, ~∇I, can only vanish on a closed set of isolated points in C. Thus I−1(0) consists
of various differentiable paths in C. The imaginary part can be expanded
I(x, y) = e
−kx2+k(y+η0)2
x2 + y2
{
sin(−2kx(y + η0))[x sin x cosh y + y cosx sinh y]
+ cos(−2kx(y + η0))[−y sin x cosh y + x cosx sinh y]
}
.
(65)
Lemma 7. There is a piecewise differentiable path z(s) such that I(z(s)) = 0. In addition, z(s) can be
written (x, yz(x)) for small and large |x|, with limx→±∞ yz(x) = C1 and limx→0 yz(x) = C2 for constants
C1 and C2.
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Proof. Consider fundamental domains in the z-plane of w = sinc(z). The fundamental domains Dj , D
′
j
shown in figure 1 are then separated by curves satisfying y = 0 and tan x/x = tanh y/y, with x 6= 0. If
x > 0, the implicit function theorem implies the latter curves can be written x = cj(y) with cj differentiable
and jπ < cj(y) < (2j+1)π/2, j = 1, 2, . . . . Let c0(y) = 0 and for x < 0, the curves are reflected: c−j = −cj .
The branch cuts in the w-planes are then the images of c2j+1. The logarithm ln(sinc z) will now map two
interior points in the z plane to a complex number since sinc(−z) = sinc(z). Branch cuts at |x| > 0 are
added in the z-plane on the x-axis to avoid discontinuities in α. The fundamental domains Dj lie below the
x-axis between the curves c2j−1 and c2j+1, whereas the D
′
j lie above the x-axis between c−2j−1 and c−2j+1.
The shaded regions of the Dj and D
′
j in the figure below correspond to the lower half of the w-planes.
Let α = α(x, y) be the angle of sinc(z) (i.e., the imaginary part of ln(sinc z)). Figure 1 shows that in
the lower half of the z-plane, α increases in x and is of order x.
Figure 1. ln(sinc z) values
Differentiating the identity for tanα,
∂α
∂x
=
2y
(
sin2 x+ sinh2 y
)− (x2 + y2) sinh 2y
2 (x2 + y2)
(
sin2 x+ sinh2 y
) (66)
∂α
∂y
=
−2x (sin2 x+ sinh2 y)+ (x2 + y2) sin 2x
2 (x2 + y2)
(
sin2 x+ sinh2 y
) (67)
and it is seen that ∂α
∂x
> 0 (< 0) when y < 0 (> 0).
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The part in braces in (65) can be written√
x2 + y2
√
sin2 x+ sinh2 y sin(−2kx(y + η0) + α), (68)
and this is zero if and only if I is zero. For the case η0 = 0, the integral in (59) can be evaluated using
Lemma 6, with the maximum of the integrand occuring at zero. In the case η0 6= 0, the paths in C on
which f(z) is real-valued is precisely where
−2kx(y + η0) + α = mπ, (69)
where m is an arbitrary integer.
Since y + η0 = α/(2kx) −mπ/(2kx) and α is of order x, it is evident that |y| → ∞ as x → 0 on such
paths unless m = 0. This is not surprising, since large |z| behavior of f is dominated by the z2 term in the
exponential (thus giving hyperbolae-type curves). We will single out the m = 0 curve z(s) = (x(s), y(s))
satisfying
y + η0 = α(x, y)/(2kx) (70)
for reevaluating the integral in (59). Since α is of order x, the y-component of z(s), y(s), is bounded
and has finite limits as x → ±∞. The location of the curve depends on η0. To see this, note that
α(x, y) < Dx for a constant D with |D| ≤ 1, and the sign of D is negative in the upper-half and positive
in the lower-half of the z-plane. If η0 > 0 and the curve z(s) were in the upper-half of the z-plane, then
y = α/(2kx)− η0 ≤ D/(2k)− η0 < 0, which is a contradiction. Hence if η0 > 0 (< 0), then the curve z(s)
is in the lower (upper) half of the z-plane.
The y-intercept of z(s) can be found using limx→0+ α = 0 and limx→0 sin(α)/α = 1. Near x = 0, z(s)
can be written z = (x, yz(x)), from which
yz(0) + η0 = lim
x→0
α
2kx
= lim
x→0
−yz sin x cosh yz + x cosx sinh yz
2kx
√
x2 + y2z
√
sin2 x cosh2 yz + cos2 x sinh
2 yz
=
−yz(0) cosh yz(0) + sinh yz(0)
2kyz(0) sinh yz(0)
.
(71)
The solutions of the above equation in yz(0) are the same as the solutions in y to the equation y/[1 −
2k(y + η0)y] = tanh(y), except for an extraneous root of y = 0 in the latter (since η0 6= 0). The solution
for the y-intercept is unique, and this will be shown later. 
With the above, the integral in (59) can be deformed onto the curve z(s). To apply Lemma 6, it is
necessary to find the maximum of |f | on the full curve where I = 0, and to also show it occurs at a single
point zm such that f(zm) > 0.
Equivalently, it will be easier to find the maximum of
|f |2 = exp [−2kx2 + 2k(y + η0)2] (sin2 x cosh2 y + cos2 x sinh2 y) /(x2 + y2) (72)
on the full I = 0 curve z(s) = (x(s), y(s)). Since lims→±∞ f(z(s)) = limx→±∞ f(x, yz(x)) = 0, a maximum
occurs and is greater than zero. On the curve near this maximum, say at sm, the argument of f is constant
(either Arg(f) = 0 or Arg(f) = π) hence tan(Arg(f)) = I/R is constant. Since tan(Arg[f(x(s), y(s))])′ =
0, the tangent vector ~v(s) to the curve (x(s), y(s)) is orthogonal to ~∇(I/R) near sm.
Any maximum point of |f |2 on the curve z(s) must satisfy
0 =
∂
∂x
|f |2 =exp[−2x
2 + 2(y + η0)
2]
(x2 + y2)2
× {−2x(2kx2 + 2ky2 + 1) (sin2 x cosh2 y + cos2 x sinh2 y)+ (x2 + y2) sin 2x} (73)
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and
0 =
∂
∂y
|f |2 =exp[−2x
2 + 2(y + η0)
2]
(x2 + y2)2
× {(4k(y + η0)(x2 + y2)− 2y) (sin2 x cosh2 y + cos2 x sinh2 y)+ (x2 + y2) sinh 2y} .
(74)
Lemma 8. The conditions in (73) and (74) imply that the maximum of |f |2 on the curve z(s) occurs at
(0, yz(0)), the y-intercept of the curve z(s).
Proof. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that η0 ≥ 0, since the integral in (59) is an even
function of η0.
For the case η0 = 0, the curve z(s) is the x-axis and |f |2(z(s)) = e−2kx2 sinc2 x. Clearly (0, 0) is a global
maximum of |f |2 on z(s). Hereon, the case η0 > 0 is considered.
We will consider the case x 6= 0, and x = 0 will be dealt with subsequently. Then (73) is equivalent to
1 > sinc 2x =
2kx2 + 2ky2 + 1
x2 + y2
(sin2 x+ sinh2 y) ≥ 0. (75)
The inequality sinc 2x ≥ 0 implies x ∈ [−π/2, π/2] or x ∈ ±[mπ, (m+1)π/2] for positive integers m. In
order for (75) to hold, sin2 x+ sinh2 y ≤ sinc(2x)(x2+ y2), which is impossible for |x| ≤ π/2. Any extreme
points of |f |2 for which x 6= 0 must therefore satisfy |x| ≥ π.
From the above argument, maximum points of |f |2 in the set S0 = {(x, y) : |x| ≤ π/2} must satisfy
x = 0. Any maximum point (x, y) /∈ S0 will then satisfy |x| ≥ π. It is seen from (70) that y+ η0 < 0 when
x > 0 and y < 0, which along with (74), implies that |y| > (π2 + y2) tanh |y| at an extreme point. That
this is impossible shows the largest value of |f |2 on the curve z(s) will occur at x = 0.
It only remains to show the intersection of z(s) with the y-axis is unique and is also a maximum
point of |f |2. Note that (73) is satisfied when x = 0. Also note that (74) reduces to the condition
[4k(y + η0)y
2 − 2y] sinh2 y + y2 sinh 2y = 0 As described by (71), y = 0 is an extraneous root since η0 > 0,
and (74) is satisfied if and only if
y
β
=
bQ2
2
(
− coth y + 1
y
)
+Q
(
bγ − h
2
)
≡ g(y). (76)
As was mentioned in Lemma 6, any solution y0 must be negative since η0 > 0. The function g(y) on
the right side of (76) decreases from bQ2/2 + Q(bγ − h/2) to Q(bγ − h/2) < 0 as y increases from −∞
to zero. Therefore g(y) intersects h(y) = y/β at exactly one point y0 < 0. This shows that there is a
unique solution y0 < 0 to (76). Consequently, the global maximum of |f |2 on z(s) occurs at (0, yz(0)), the
y-intercept of the curve z(s). 
Combining the result of Lemma 8 with Lemma 6, it is seen that
F (β, a, b, c, q, q¯) = lim
n→∞
1
βn
ln(Zn,β,a,b,c,q,q¯) = −γ(bγ − h) + lnQ
β
+
1
β
ln [f(0, yz(0))] , (77)
and the unique global maximum of |f | at (0, yz(0)) on the curve z(s) excludes any phase transition for this
antiferromagnetic model.
Finally, notice that Lemma 8 shows that the only extreme point of |f |2 on the y-axis is at the y-
intercept of the curve z(s). This extreme point must be a saddle point of the holomorphic function f(z),
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hence (0, yz(0)) is a global minimum of v(y) = f(0, y). An explicit formula for the Cournot free energy
can then be written
F (β, a, b, c, q, q¯) =− 1
4
(q¯ + q)[b(q¯ + q)− 2(a− c)] + ln(q¯ − q)
β
+
1
β
min
y∈(−∞,∞)
−βby2 + ln
(
sinhc
[
βb(q¯ − q)y + β (q¯ − q)
2
{b(q¯ + q)− (a− c)}
]) (78)
where y was translated and rescaled (this does not alter the result since y ranges over all real numbers) to
get rid of square roots, and sinhc(u) = sinh(u)/u with sinhc(0) = 1.
Now for a final note on the expected value of the variable qi. The minimum value in (78) occurs when the
derivative of the smooth function within the minimum is zero, which is at ym = yz(0). Since the minimum
is a global minimum, the second derivative with respect to y is nonzero. By the implicit function theorem,
the minimum point ym is locally a smooth function of h = a− c. As a result, the partition function in the
form (77) is seen to be a smooth function of h.
The function Fn(h) in (53) is convex in h via Holder’s inequality, and as a result
Fn(h)− Fn(h− δ)
δ
≤ F ′n(h) ≤
Fn(h+ δ)− Fn(h)
δ
(79)
where δ > 0. Since F (h) is a smooth function of h, taking the limit of (79) as n → ∞ results in
F ′(h) = limn→∞ F
′
n(h). Using (59)
F ′n(h) = γ − η/b− i〈tˆ〉∧n/(2β
√
b), (80)
where 〈·〉∧n is a (one-dimensional) Fourier transform of the Gibbs measure for n agents, 〈f〉n = (
∫
f eβV )/Zn,
which is generated by (52). The measure 〈·〉∧n is generated by the form of the partition function in (59).
Taking the limit of (80) as n→∞,
F ′(h) = h/(2b) + lim
n→∞
〈2t/(Q
√
b)〉∧n/(2β
√
b). (81)
The latter limit can be evaluated by deforming the integral in the complex plane as before (change t
to z), and using Lemma 6. The sequence 〈·〉∧n of measures converges to a ‘delta function’ or evaluation
measure at (0, ym). Such measures are precisely the characters, meaning they are homomorphisms on the
‘algebra of observables’ and as such are extreme points. This shows that there is no phase transition in
this antiferromagnetic model. It is worthwhile to elaborate on such technicalities to show that the weak
convergence of the Fourier transformed measures implies that the sequence of measures 〈·〉n converges
weakly. With Lemma 9, this implies the Gibbs measures 〈·〉n converge weakly to the infinite-agent measure
〈·〉.
Lemma 9. The weak convergence of the sequence 〈·〉∧n of measures 12 implies the weak convergence of the
sequence of Gibbs measures 〈·〉n.
Proof. Let An be the algebra of observables for n agents, which is simply L
∞([q, q¯]n, dq1 · dqn). The algebra
of observables (functions) for an infinite number of agents, A∞, is the inductive limit (von Neumann algebra
sense) of the finite-agent algebras An. As a result, the An can be considered subalgebras of A∞ and any
weak limit of finite-agent measures is defined on A∞.
Consider two distinct limit points 〈·〉, 〈·〉′ ∈ A∗∞ which are limits of subsequences 〈·〉n1 and 〈·〉n2, respec-
tively. There is a function g ∈ A∞ on which 〈·〉 and 〈·〉′ differ. By approximating g closely enough with a
function in some An0 we may assume g ∈ An0 .
12This is the one-dimensional Fourier transform of the Gibbs measures 〈·〉n in the variable sn ≡ (q1 + · · ·+ qn)/√n that
is generated by the partition function in (59)
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The integral 〈g〉ni over the qj , 1 ≤ j ≤ ni can be manipulated into an integral over the variable tˆ as was
done with (59), upon which it becomes an integral 〈G〉∧ni, where G = G(tˆ) is a function independent of ni.
This shows 〈g〉 = limn1〈G〉∧n1 and 〈g〉′ = limn2〈G〉∧n2, which implies the assertion. 
Remark. With ~q = (q1, . . . , qn), g = g(~q), note that (56) inserts the Fourier transform F (of the Gibbs
measure) into the 〈g〉n integral, and (57) shows what the dual of the Fourier transform, F∗ does to g. 13
The Fourier transform of the Gibbs measures need only converge on the subalgebra of functions generated
by the F∗[An] in order for the sequence of Gibbs measures to converge.
The expected value 〈qi〉 is then
F ′(h) =
h
2b
+
ym(β, b, h)
βQb
. (82)
From (76), we can see that
lim
β→0
F ′(h) =
h
2b
+
(
γ − h
2b
)
= γ, (83)
which simply states that for completely irrational behavior (i.e.,‘high temperature’), the agents will act
randomly, and the Gibbs-Cournot measure will be uniform. As such, the expected value 〈qi〉 over the
interval [q, q¯] is the average γ = (q¯ + q)/2.
In the completely rational limit (i.e., ‘zero temperature’), if Q/2+γ−h/(2b) > 0 and η ≤ 0 (equivalently,
if γ ≤ h/(2b) < q¯), then the curve g(y) which equals the right side of (76) has a positive limit as y → −∞.
In this case, the line h(y) = y/β intersects g(y) at a point with y-value ym which has a finite limit as
β →∞. Thus ym/β → 0 as β →∞ and
lim
β→∞
F ′(h) =
h
2b
for γ ≤ h/(2b) < q¯. (84)
In the case when h/(2b) ≥ q¯, the curve g(y) is always negative-valued. As a result, ym → −∞ as β →∞.
In this case, g(y) can be used to evaluate ym/β and
lim
β→∞
F ′(h) =
h
2b
+
(
Q
2
+ γ − h
2b
)
= q¯ for h/(2b) ≥ q¯. (85)
Since the integral in (59) is even in η = bγ − h/2, limβ→∞ F ′(h) = q when h/(2b) ≤ q. If bγ − h/2 > 0,
then g(y) in (76) is shifted up and g(0) > 0. With this, g(y) can only intersect the line y/β at positive ym.
It is then seen that ym > 0 when h/(2b) < γ and ym ≤ 0 when h/(2b) ≥ γ.
In summary, we see that the expected value 〈qi〉 in the irrational case is the average value (q¯+q)/2. In the
completely rational case, we recover the classical Nash equilibrium value 〈qi〉 = h/(2b) when q ≤ h/(2b) ≤ q¯.
When h/(2b) < q (> q¯) then 〈qi〉 will be q (q¯). For finite β, the equilibrium 〈qi〉 will be smaller (larger) than
h/(2b) if h/(2b) itself is larger (smaller) than the average γ = (q¯+q)/2. Furthermore the graphical analysis
below (76) shows that |ym|/β is a decreasing function of β, and ym < 0(> 0) when h/(2b) > γ(< γ). As
a result, the agents deviate farther from the Nash equilibrium h/(2b) and closer to the average γ as β
decreases (i.e., as deviations from rationality increase).
13In particular, F∗[g](
√
bt) =
∫
exp(i
√
btsn)E[g(sn, s
⊥
n )χQ(s, s
⊥
n )|sn]dsn, where s⊥n are integration variables orthogonal
to sn, χQ is the indicator function on ~q ∈ [−Q/2, Q/2]n, and E[·|sn] is the conditional expectation over the subalgebra of
functions in the variables s⊥n .
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The volatility (i.e., susceptibility)
χ =
1
β
F ′′(h) = lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i,j=1
〈qiqj〉 − 〈qi〉〈qj〉 (86)
can be evaluated in a similar manner. Let
G(h, y) =
bQ2
2
(
− coth y + 1
y
)
+Q
(
bγ − h
2
)
− y
β
, (87)
which equals zero at points (h, ym(h)). Then
1
β
dym
dh
=
Q
βbQ2(sinh−2 ym − y−2m )− 2
. (88)
In the irrational limit, limβ→0 ym = 0 and limβ→0 = (sinh
−2 ym− y−2m ) = −1/3. Differentiating (82) results
in
χ =
Q2(sinh−2 ym − y−2m )/2
βbQ2(sinh−2 ym − y−2m )− 2
, (89)
and as a result
lim
β→0
χ =
Q2
12
. (90)
In the completely rational limit, either ym converges to a finite value (when (q + q¯)/2 < h/(2b) < q¯) or
goes to −∞ (when h/(2b) ≥ q¯). If ym converges to a finite limit, then the denominator of (89) goes to
−∞ and limβ→∞ χ = 0. If ym goes to −∞, then χ ≤ (Q2/4)| sinh−2 ym − y−2m | and limβ→∞ χ = 0. Using
that (59) in even in η as before,
lim
β→∞
χ = 0. (91)
In summary, when agents behave randomly in the irrational limit, the volatility is simply the variance
of a uniform random variable. Each agent becomes decorrolated from the other agents and the volatility
is the limiting-average of the volatility of each agent. When agents are completely rational they all output
at the Nash equilibrium values and do not deviate from that, which is reflected by zero volatility.
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